Roots of war

Historical tradition dates the Hundred Years War between England and France as running from 1337 to 1453. In 1337, Edward III had responded to the confiscation of his duchy of Aquitaine by King Philip VI of France by challenging Philip’s right to the French throne. We have studied the causes of the war, plus the first ‘phase’, ending in 1360 with the Treaty of Bretigny.

The overseas possessions of the English kings were the root cause of the tensions with the kings of France, and the tensions reached back right to 1066. William the Conqueror was already duke of Normandy when he became king of England. His great-grandson Henry II, at his accession in 1154, was already count of Anjou by inheritance from his father and duke of Aquitaine (Gascony and Poitou) in right of his wife Eleanor. These trans-Channel possessions made the kings of England easily the mightiest of the king of France’s vassals, and the inevitable friction between them repeatedly escalated into open hostilities. The Hundred Years War grew out of these earlier clashes and their consequences.

England’s King John lost Normandy and Anjou to France in 1204. His son, Henry III, renounced his claim to those lands in the Treaty of Paris in 1259, but it left him with Gascony as a duchy held under the French crown. The rights of English kings in Gascony after this continued to be a source of tension, and wars broke out in 1294 and 1324.

The auld alliance between Scotland and France was clear in 1294 when conflict between England and France coincided with Edward I’s first clash with the Scots, and from then the French and Scots were allied in all subsequent confrontations with England. It was indeed French support for David Bruce of Scotland, in the face of Edward III’s intervention there, that triggered the breakdown between England and France and culminated in Philip VI’s confiscation of Aquitaine in 1337 - the event that precipitated the Hundred Years War.

Edward’s 1337 riposte - challenging Philip’s right to the French throne - introduced a new issue that distinguished this war from previous confrontations. In 1328, Charles IV of France had died without a male heir. A claim for the succession to the French throne had been made for Edward, then 15 years old, through the right of his mother Isabella, daughter of Philip IV and Charles IV’s sister. But he was passed over in favour of Philip, the son of Philip IV’s younger brother, Charles of Valois.
Edward now revived his claim, and in 1340 formally assumed the title 'King of France and the French Royal Arms'. Historians argue about whether Edward really believed he might actually attain the French throne. Irrespective, his claim gave him very important leverage in his dealings with Philip. He could use it to stir up trouble by encouraging French malcontents to recognise him as king instead of Philip.

Edward III and the Black Prince as military leaders

Expeditions through French countryside had a very major impact. They took the form of large-scale, swift-moving military raids (chevauchées) deep into France and were intended, through systematic plundering and the burning of crops and buildings, to damage the economy and undermine French civilian morale. The conquest of territory was not an object, but Edward was quite ready to engage a pursuing French army in open battle if he could do so in advantageous circumstances. He rightly reckoned that economic damage and defeat in the field would force his adversary to the negotiating table.

Edward III’s great chevauchée of 1346 climaxed in his victory at Crécy, and was followed by the successful siege of Calais, securing for England a key maritime port on the French channel coast. The two chevauchées that his heir, Edward the ‘Black Prince’, led out from Bordeaux in 1355 and 1356 were even more gloriously successful in terms of plunder. The second of these culminated in the victory at Poitiers, where John of France, Philip’s successor, was taken prisoner.

Between 1356 and 1360, chaos engulfed the kingless French kingdom, with Charles of Navarre in revolt and temporarily controlling Paris in 1358. There was also a major peasant rising in the same year, in the central provinces (the 'Jacquerie'), and freebooting companies of soldiers on the rampage almost everywhere. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that in 1359 Edward III’s last chevauchée was aimed at Rheims, in the clear hope of a coronation there. But Rheims did not open its gates and nor did Paris. The abortive expedition ended instead in the opening of negotiations with Charles, the dauphin (heir apparent to the French throne), which led in May 1360 to the sealing of the Treaty of Brétigny.

The principle terms of the treaty were that France should pay three million crowns for King John’s ransom, and that he would give Edward an enlarged Aquitaine, wholly independent of the French crown. In return, Edward would renounce his claim to the French throne. For the next nine years Edward did indeed cease to use the title king of France.